Africa’s Currency Landscape: How Many Currencies, Backing, Regimes & Digital Money

Out of Africa’s 54 countries, many share currencies through regional arrangements, reducing the total distinct currencies in use to roughly 41–42. The largest blocs are the CFA franc zones: eight West African nations (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) use the West African CFA franc (XOF) and six Central African nations (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon) use the Central African CFA franc (XAF). Both CFA currencies have a common origin and identical value, effectively functioning as one (each is firmly fixed at 655.957 CFA to 1 euro) under French guarantorship. Another major bloc is the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in southern Africa, where South Africa’s rand is legal tender across Namibia, Lesotho, and Eswatini. These three smaller CMA members issue their own currencies (the Namibian dollar, Lesotho loti, and Eswatini lilangeni) but strictly peg them to the rand at parity, effectively creating a rand zone. Outside these unions, most African nations have their own currencies – from the Nigerian naira to the Kenyan shilling – each reflecting unique national histories and priorities.

Current estimates put the number of distinct African currencies at just over 40. This count treats each CFA franc zone as a single currency and accounts for the currency unions. (By comparison, Africa has more than twice as many currencies as the entire eurozone, despite a similar number of countries.) The multiplicity poses challenges for intra-African trade, as every cross-border transaction often requires converting between currencies – a costly process usually involving intermediaries like the US dollar or euro. Indeed, intra-African trade remains low (~15% of total trade) in part due to these currency frictions. This has spurred ongoing conversations about greater monetary integration, from subregional common currencies to an eventual pan-African currency (the hypothetical “Afro”).

African currencies today owe much to history. During the colonial era (late 19th to mid-20th century), European powers imposed their own currencies or created local versions for use in colonies. For example, French colonies in West and Central Africa used the franc, which evolved into the CFA franc in 1945 – a colonial currency that persists to this day. British colonies in West Africa and East Africa had currency boards issuing the West African pound and East African shilling, respectively. These colonial currencies were typically pegged to the metropole’s currency (the British pound or French franc), facilitating control over trade. As one study puts it, many African nations entered independence using money with “colonial origins and ongoing colonial functions,” a mechanism by which former colonial powers (notably France via the CFA franc) maintained monetary influence. The CFA franc, still used by 14 countries, is frequently cited as Africa’s “last colonial currency” – a French-backed arrangement that has provided stability but also drawn criticism for impeding monetary sovereignty.

With the wave of independence in the 1950s–60s, new African states faced decisions on currency. Many retained the existing unit initially (often pegged to the former colonizer’s currency) to ensure continuity. For instance, Nigeria kept the Nigerian pound (derived from the British West African pound) after 1960, before introducing the Naira in 1973 as a decimalized national currency. Similarly, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda replaced the East African shilling with their own shillings by the late 1960s. Francophone states had more complex journeys: Guinea was the first to exit the CFA zone in 1960, creating the Guinea franc; Mali left the CFA in 1962 for a national franc but rejoined in 1984; Mauritania and Madagascar left the CFA system in the 1970s, establishing the Ouguiya and Malagasy franc (ariary) respectively. These moves were often driven by a desire for monetary autonomy. However, some countries later re-pegged or joined currency unions when national currencies faltered – e.g. Guinea-Bissau (a former Portuguese colony) abandoned its inflation-plagued peso to adopt the CFA franc in 1997, and Equatorial Guinea (ex-Spanish colony) joined the Central African CFA franc in 1985.

Newly independent countries often renamed their currencies to assert national identity. The Ghanaian cedi, introduced in 1965 by replacing the Ghana pound, took its name from the local Akan language ( “cedi” meaning cowry shell, a historic medium of exchange). Over the decades, episodes of high inflation forced many African currencies into redenomination – essentially knocking zeros off and issuing new notes. Ghana, for example, revalued its currency in 2007 at 1 new cedi for 10,000 old cedi after years of inflation. Other cases include Zambia (cutting three zeros in 2013 on the kwacha), Mozambique (three zeros off in 2006 for the metical), Zimbabwe (which has redenominated multiple times amid hyperinflation), and Sierra Leone (removing three zeros in 2022 from the leone). Such reforms aimed to simplify transactions and restore confidence, albeit usually after painful bouts of inflation. Meanwhile, a few African currencies have been remarkably stable over the long term – for instance, the Libyan dinar and Tunisian dinar historically held far higher value per US dollar than most others, reflecting past strict pegs and controlled economies. But even these have seen depreciation in recent years under economic strain.

African countries employ a spectrum of exchange rate regimes, ranging from hard pegs to free floats. Notably, over half of African nations maintain some form of peg or tightly managed exchange rate. The fixed (pegged) regimes are concentrated in specific zones and small economies:

• Euro-pegged: 14 countries in the CFA franc zones rigidly peg their currency to the euro (formerly to the French franc) at a fixed rate (e.g. 1 EUR = 655.957 XOF/XAF). In addition, Comoros pegs its franc to the euro at €1 = 491.96775 KMF under an arrangement with France, and Cabo Verde fixes its escudo at €1 ≈ 110.27 CVE. São Tomé & Príncipe similarly entered a formal peg of its dobra to the euro (24,500 STD per euro, or 24.5 new dobras after the 2018 redenomination) to stabilize its tiny economy.
  
• US dollar-pegged: A few countries tie their currencies to the US dollar. Djibouti’s franc has been fixed at about 177.72 DJF = $1 since 1973, a currency-board arrangement backed by US dollar reserves. Eritrea maintains a peg for the nakfa at ERN 15 = $1, though access to dollars is restricted. Until recently, Sudan and South Sudan also attempted quasi-pegs to the dollar, but conflict and inflation have caused official rates to spiral away from any stable anchor. In North Africa, Morocco pegs its dirham to a basket (weighted roughly 60% euro, 40% dollar) in a tightly managed band (currently ±5%), while Algeria and Tunisia operate managed peg/float hybrids – effectively adjusting their dinars gradually, without a free float, meaning their governments adjust the value of their currency slowly and carefully, instead of letting the market fully control it or keeping it fixed to another currency like the U.S. dollar at one unchanging rate.
  
• Rand-pegged: In the Common Monetary Area, Lesotho, Eswatini, and Namibia all peg their currencies at par to the South African rand (which is also legal tender locally). This link has existed for decades and helps these smaller economies stabilize prices, though at the cost of outsourcing monetary policy to the South African Reserve Bank.
  
  

The rationale for pegged regimes is to ensure stability: By tying to a major currency, a country can anchor inflation and facilitate predictable trade. Pegs “provide greater certainty for importers and exporters and help maintain moderate inflation,” as one analysis notes. For example, the CFA franc’s euro peg kept inflation in the Franc Zone to low single digits for years, a notable contrast to double-digit price rises in many peer countries. However, the downside is loss of flexibility – central banks cannot easily adjust interest rates or devalue to respond to shocks under a hard peg. An overvalued peg can hurt exports and growth, a critique often leveled at the CFA arrangement. Moreover, maintaining a peg requires ample foreign reserves or external support. The CFA franc is bolstered by a convertibility guarantee from the French Treasury (each CFA central bank must hold at least 50% of foreign reserves in a French operations account) – a controversial mechanism seen by some as anachronistic, yet it underpins confidence. Other pegs like Djibouti’s currency board require 100% (or more) reserve backing in foreign currency to defend the fixed rate, effectively ceding monetary independence for stability.

Outside the pegged group, the majority of African countries have managed floats or free-floating currencies:

• Managed floats: Many larger economies ostensibly allow their currencies to float (i.e., have their value determined by market forces of supply and demand without a fixed exchange rate) but with frequent central bank intervention or periodic adjustments. Egypt, for instance, floated the pound in 2016 (i.e., allowed the currency’s exchange rate to be determined by the market rather than fixed by the central bank) but still managed its value until repeated crises forced sharp devaluations in 2022–2023.. Nigeria officially maintained a “managed float” in recent years, though in practice the central bank tightly controlled the rate through a system of multiple exchange windows and capital controls. This led to chronic divergence between the official rate and a much weaker parallel market rate, until mid-2023 when Nigeria’s new leadership moved to unify rates – triggering a one-off 25% drop in the naira. Ethiopia and Kenya likewise manage their floats: Ethiopia uses a slow crawling devaluation of the birr (the national currency of Ethiopia), while Kenya intervenes during volatility to smooth the shilling’s fluctuations. Morocco and Zambia provide examples of moving from fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes to more flexible ones – Morocco widened its dirham’s trading band (on path to a float), and Zambia let its kwacha float freely in 2015 after a long peg, accepting more volatility in exchange for policy autonomy.
  
• Free (or mostly free) floats: A handful of African currencies trade with relatively limited central bank interference, their values determined by market supply and demand. The prime example is the South African rand, which has been a free-floating currency for decades. South Africa’s deep financial markets and inflation-targeting regime lend credibility, but the rand is notoriously volatile, often reacting strongly to global risk sentiment. Other floaters include the Ghanaian cedi (Ghana formally adopted inflation targeting and a floating rate, though the central bank still intervenes during disorderly moves) and the Botswana pula (managed within a crawling band against a basket, but effectively quite flexible). Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya allow their shillings to float, with central banks stepping in mainly to curb excess swings. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the currencies float amid shallow markets – Liberia even allows US dollars to circulate alongside its Liberian dollar, reflecting partial dollarization.

Overall, while about 22 African countries claim to have floating regimes de jure (i.e., by law or official declaration), many of those are de facto (i.e., in actual practice) managed. Hard pegs (to euro, dollar, or rand) exist in roughly 20 countries. The remainder fall in between, with stabilized or crawl-like arrangements that adjust over time rather than truly free-float. The IMF’s (International Monetary Fund’s) classification often differs from what central banks announce – for example, Nigeria long insisted it was floating even as it heavily restricted the forex market. The trend in recent years has been toward greater flexibility under pressure: oil exporters like Angola and Egypt were compelled to float/devalue after running down reserves, and Nigeria and Ethiopia are gradually easing their grip. Still, the popular approach in Africa remains a soft peg, given the desire to avoid exchange rate volatility that could stoke inflation. As a trade-off, countries with pegs must subordinate monetary policy to the anchor currency’s conditions – a constraint evident when the European Central Bank or U.S. Federal Reserve hikes rates, forcing tighter conditions on African peggers too.

Most modern currencies are fiat money, backed not by gold or silver but by the confidence in the issuing government and central bank policy. African currencies are no exception – none are presently on a gold standard. (In fact, no country worldwide pegs its currency to gold today; that practice ended with the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971.) However, some African currencies derive backing through foreign reserve arrangements or explicit convertibility guarantees:

• The CFA franc zones are unique in that France guarantees unlimited convertibility of CFA francs into euros. In return, member countries deposit half of their foreign reserves with the French treasury. This arrangement means the CFA franc’s value is effectively “backed” by France’s reserve holdings and fiscal credibility, reassuring investors that CFA francs can always be converted to hard currency at the fixed rate. Critics argue this mechanism entrenches external control – a “persistent French domination” over monetary matters – but supporters credit it for low inflation and full convertibility. As of 2023, reforms have been agreed in principle (for West Africa’s CFA to become the Eco, with the French guarantee eventually removed), but the peg to the euro is set to remain.
  
• Currency boards: Djibouti’s and formerly Zimbabwe’s regimes resemble a currency board, where local currency issuance is tightly linked to foreign asset holdings. Djibouti’s franc has effectively been backed 100% by US dollar reserves for decades, which is why its value against the dollar hasn’t budged since 1973. This rule-based backing boosts confidence in the DJF but also means Djibouti’s monetary policy is on “autopilot,” importing U.S. inflation and interest rates. Zimbabwe flirted with a quasi-currency-board idea in 2019 when reintroducing the Zimbabwe dollar, but extreme inflation derailed it. Instead, Zimbabwe issued gold coins in 2022 as an alternate store of value to support the currency, a novel approach to inject trust by tangibly backing some money with gold. Still, Zimbabwe’s ZWL (Zimbabwean Dollar) is not formally pegged or redeemable for gold; the coins were more of an inflation hedge instrument.
  
• Foreign reserves: Almost all African central banks hold foreign exchange reserves (typically USD, euros, and increasingly some Chinese yuan and SDRs – Special Drawing Rights – an IMF-created international reserve asset used to support global liquidity and supplement countries’ foreign exchange reserves) to backstop their currencies. These reserves serve to defend pegs (by selling dollars to buy local currency when under pressure) or to smooth volatility in managed floats. For instance, Morocco and Kenya have used reserves to intervene when their currencies faced speculative attacks, and Nigeria has historically spent billions from its oil-fed reserves to prop up the naira’s peg. For example, in 2025, the federal government spent about $8 billion to stabilize the exchange rate of the naira to the US dollar, with interventions attributed to the Central Bank of Nigeria using foreign reserves to support the currency. The adequacy of reserves varies widely – resource-rich countries like Algeria and Angola built up war chests during commodity booms, whereas others run perilously low buffers. By late 2023, several African nations had reserves covering only a few months of imports, prompting IMF support programs to bolster confidence. Some countries (e.g. Ghana) even engaged in swap lines or repurchase agreements using commodities (like gold and cocoa) to obtain foreign currency, effectively leveraging assets to back their currency.
  
• Trust and legal tender: In the final analysis, a currency’s strength rests on public trust in its issuer. Central banks try to reinforce this by statutory mandates (e.g. no direct deficit financing, inflation targeting – simply, rules that prevent them from printing money to cover government spending and goals to keep inflation low) and by accumulating credibility over time. A few African central banks are renowned for their independence – the South African Reserve Bank and Bank of Botswana have reputations for prudent management, which underpins the rand and pula, respectively. Others have struggled; when a central bank is seen as financing the government freely, the currency quickly loses credibility (as experienced in Zimbabwe, Sudan, and recently Ghana). Convertibility also plays a role: in some countries, capital controls restrict the ability to convert local currency to foreign currency, which can erode confidence if black markets emerge. In contrast, a fully convertible currency under a credible regime tends to garner more trust. For example, Botswana’s pula has been fully convertible and relatively stable for decades, aided by strong reserves from diamond exports and conservative fiscal policy.

In summary, while gold no longer backs African money, other pillars do: foreign reserves, external guarantees, and – importantly – sound policy. When those pillars falter, people quickly seek refuge in harder currencies like the US dollar. This dynamic is evident in economies with high inflation or instability, where unofficial dollarization occurs as locals lose faith in the local unit.

African currencies span a wide range of values against the US dollar, reflecting differences in inflation history and economic size. A handful of North African currencies are relatively strong (fewer units per USD): for example, 1 USD ≈ 3.1 Moroccan dirhams or ≈ 30 Egyptian pounds (official rate) as of early 2025, and around 4.8 Libyan dinars. In contrast, some Sub-Saharan currencies have much lower unit values: 1 USD ~ 750 Nigerian naira (official) after the mid-2023 devaluation, ≈ 600 CFA francs, ≈ 2,000 Sierra Leonean leones (new leone), and ≈ 1,000,000+ Zimbabwean dollars (ZWL, highly inflated). It’s important to note that a “lower” value (more zeros) doesn’t necessarily mean a weaker economy; it usually means the currency has undergone inflation or re-denomination. For instance, Japan’s yen is ~130 per USD, but Japan is very stable – the yen simply was never re-based. Likewise, many African currencies started at par with major currencies at independence but drifted down over decades of inflation.

In recent years, numerous African currencies have hit all-time lows against the US dollar amid global and domestic pressures. According to a Mo Ibrahim Foundation analysis, 23 African currencies registered their lowest historical valuation against the dollar in the first half of 2024. This includes even traditionally stable units. For example, the Nigerian naira lost over 200% of its value (i.e. fell to one-third) against the dollar between May 2023 and late 2024, following the removal of currency controls. The Ethiopian birr has lost half its official value since 2019 due to a steady crawl devaluation and conflict impacts. The Tunisian dinar, under a more gradual depreciation, slid about 72% vs the euro from 2011 to 2022. Even the South African rand – which floats freely – has seen periodic tumbles to record lows (e.g. during the 2020 COVID shock). In general, the combination of the strong post-pandemic US dollar (bolstered by Fed rate hikes) and local vulnerabilities caused many African currencies to depreciate substantially through 2022–2023.

A critical issue in several African economies is the divergence between the official exchange rate and a parallel (black market) rate. When central banks impose capital controls or peg a rate that doesn’t reflect market equilibrium, a shadow market emerges where the currency finds a lower value. For example, in Nigeria before 2023, the official rate was tightly managed (around ₦420 per USD) while the parallel market rate drifted much weaker (₦700+ per USD at times), reflecting dollar scarcity. By late 2022, this gap was around 60%, effectively a hefty tax on those who couldn’t access the official window See nesgroup.org May 2024 report. After Nigeria unified its exchange rates in June 2023, the naira initially stabilized around ₦750–800 per USD. However, it later depreciated to about ₦853 officially by December 2023, marking a 46% drop in value since the reform. Meanwhile, a parallel market re-emerged, with rates about 40% weaker than the official rate.

Egypt is another vivid case: by early 2024, the official rate of the Egyptian pound was EGP 30.9 per USD, while the black market rate soared to nearly EGP 60—double the official rate. This 100% premium reflects severe dollar shortages and waning trust in the official peg. Both rates had roughly doubled in a year due to rising import costs and capital flight. Such dual exchange rate systems undermine economic stability, fuel inflation, and deter investment. Similar issues have occurred in Sudan, Lebanon, Angola, and Ethiopia, where unsustainable pegs eventually gave way to currency unification or floating.

The presence of parallel markets indicates pent-up devaluation pressure. It often accompanies foreign exchange rationing by central banks – for instance, Nigeria and Ethiopia imposed import restrictions or quota allocations of forex. While such controls can temporarily defend reserves, they breed corruption and hurt business confidence.

For African citizens, a weak and volatile currency is not just an abstract economic issue – it hits daily life. When local money rapidly loses value, people often seek refuge in hard currencies or assets. It’s common to see prices quoted in USD in countries like Zimbabwe, Sudan, or Somalia, or a “dollarization” of savings (keeping wealth in dollars, euros, or even stable cryptocurrencies). In extreme cases, countries abandon their currency: Zimbabwe infamously suspended the Zim dollar in 2009 and officially used USD and rand for a decade; Somalia’s shilling became so unstable in the 1990s that the economy informally dollarized (and even today, large transactions or rentals in Mogadishu are in USD). Many francophone West Africans hold euros as a hedge despite the CFA’s stability, underscoring a general challenge: strong external currencies remain a yardstick of trust. This sets the stage for our next article on de-dollarization efforts, as African nations grapple with how to strengthen confidence in local currencies and reduce over-reliance on the greenback.

Africa experienced a pronounced rise in inflation during 2022–2023, reversing the relatively calm price environment of the 2010s. The African Development Bank reported that average consumer inflation climbed from 12.9% in 2021 to 14.2% in 2022 and was forecast to peak at 15.1% in 2023, driven by global commodity shocks (notably food and energy), currency depreciations, and local factors such as droughts and policy missteps. Over fifteen countries recorded double-digit inflation, with Zimbabwe, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Ghana briefly exceeding 50%. Pegged-currency zones like the CFA franc region fared better—maintaining inflation around 6–7%—but at the expense of policy flexibility, while floaters such as Ghana and Nigeria saw rates of 30–50% and ~20%, respectively.

Monetary frameworks are gradually modernizing: South Africa and Ghana have long used formal inflation-targeting regimes, and Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda have adopted “lite” versions. These frameworks were stress-tested in 2022, prompting aggressive rate hikes in South Africa (350 bps) and Ghana (to 30%). Elsewhere, many central banks still emphasize exchange-rate or monetary-aggregate targets. Fiscal pressures remain a challenge—money financing of deficits has fueled past hyperinflations, so recent reforms under IMF programs have sought to strengthen central bank independence. Finally, reserve management and regional arrangements (e.g., CFA guarantees, SACU alignment, and emerging East African policy convergence) have provided varying degrees of stability, underscoring the critical interplay between currency regimes, policy credibility, and external resilience.

Africa’s long-standing pursuit of monetary integration aims to simplify trade, enhance financial flows, and support collective stability by replacing dozens of often volatile national currencies with larger regional or continental currency unions. Key initiatives include:

• ECOWAS “Eco” (West Africa):
  
  • Intended to unite all 15 ECOWAS members—merging the eight CFA-franc countries with seven anglophone states under a single “Eco.”
    
  • Originally rebranded the CFA franc in 2019, but retained its euro peg, sparking concerns about flexibility and governance.
    
  • Launch postponed by COVID-19, now targeting 2027; meeting convergence criteria (inflation, deficits) remains a major hurdle.
    
• East African Monetary Union (EAMU):
  
  • Plans a common East African shilling across the EAC’s six core members (plus DR Congo), reviving the colonial-era currency board.
    
  • The initial 2024 deadline was pushed to around 2030–31 due to divergent inflation rates and fiscal discipline.
    
  • An East African Monetary Institute was established in 2018 to align policies ahead of the union.
    
• Southern Africa (SADC/CMA):
  
  • The existing Common Monetary Area pegs member currencies to the South African rand.
    
  • Broader SADC ambitions for a single currency have stalled, with any deeper integration likely to revolve around rand-zone enlargement rather than a new SADC currency.
    
• Continental Vision (African Monetary Union):
  
  • Enshrined in AU Agenda 2063 as a far-off goal (“Afro” or “Afriq”), but deemed unfeasible without a strong fiscal union.
    
  • In the interim, the AfCFTA and the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) (launched in 2022) aim to ease intra-African payments by handling currency conversions behind the scenes.
    

Outlook: Success will rest on strict adherence to convergence criteria (especially inflation and debt), political will, and governance frameworks that can absorb asymmetric economic shocks. Lessons from the eurozone underscore the need for fiscal coordination and solidarity mechanisms—balancing stability against sovereignty remains the central challenge for Africa’s currency-union ambitions.

Africa’s fintech landscape today is defined by two major trends: the cautious rollout of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and the explosive growth of mobile money. Nigeria’s eNaira—which launched in October 2021—has seen limited uptake (under 0.5% of the population in year one), prompting the central bank to tie CBDC usage to welfare disbursements. Ghana’s eCedi pilot adds offline functionality to reach rural users, while countries like South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Kenya, and Mauritius explore wholesale and retail CBDC models. Yet many experts question whether CBDCs are necessary where robust mobile-money ecosystems already exist.

Mobile money remains the true powerhouse: by end-2024 Africa accounted for 53% of global mobile-money accounts (1.1 billion) and over 65% of transaction value ($1.1 trillion) . Services like M-Pesa, MTN Mobile Money, Orange Money, and EcoCash enable financial inclusion for unbanked populations, reinforce local currencies, and even facilitate cross-border transfers. Though mobile wallets don’t insulate users from currency devaluations, they dramatically lower transaction costs and have become critical lifelines during crises and lockdowns.

As African central banks navigate the balance between innovation and stability, mobile money offers a proven foundation upon which digital currencies and policy innovations can build. Governments and regulators must ensure proper backing of e-money, safeguard against cyber-risks, and preserve the role of commercial banks—even as they leverage mobile-money infrastructure to drive financial inclusion.

Read the full analysis in our blog: The Impact of Mobile Money in Africa

Africa’s currency landscape is one of great diversity and dynamic change. From the “franc zones” anchored to Europe, to floating currencies riding commodity booms and busts, to new digital frontiers with eNaira and mobile money, the continent encapsulates nearly every monetary regime in existence. The historical journey from colonial currencies to independent ones still echoes today in debates over the CFA franc and calls for truly sovereign currencies. Economic realities vary: some countries enjoy relative stability and low inflation, while others battle chronic currency weakness and public distrust in money.

What is clear is that monetary stability is foundational for development – high inflation and chaotic exchange rates act as a hidden tax and deterrent to investment. African policymakers recognize this, hence the moves toward tighter monetary governance, regional cooperation, and innovation in fintech. The next few years will be pivotal. Will we see the birth of the Eco or the East African shilling, forging larger common markets? Can African nations reduce their dependency on external currencies and “own” more of their monetary destiny? Those questions lead directly into the discussion of de-dollarization and financial sovereignty. In the second part of this series, we will examine how African countries are seeking to “shake off the dollar yoke,” through strategies like reserve currency diversification, local currency swap agreements, and strengthening of continental financial institutions. We will explore expert insights on whether a multipolar currency world could benefit Africa or whether the US dollar will remain king for the foreseeable future.

Africa’s financial story is one of resilience and ingenuity – from cowrie shells of the pre-colonial era to blockchain-based currencies of tomorrow. Understanding the currency framework is not just an academic exercise; it’s key for anyone doing business on the continent or formulating policy. As African entrepreneur Mo Ibrahim once noted, “If trade is the lifeblood of Africa’s future, currencies are the veins through which it must flow.” Getting the currency piece right – stable, trusted, and suitably integrated – will go a long way in unlocking Africa’s vast economic potential in the 21st century.